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COURT, THE CONSTITUTION, AND
THE A. A. A.
By ROBERT L. HOWARD*

Until somewhat recently, most people other than lawyers,
have, no doubt, been accustomed to look upon the Supreme
Court of the United States as something rather far removed
from their every-day lives, whose decisions likely were to be regarded as of very little immediate importance to them. Such,
however, is no longer true.
During the past two or three years the attention of the
American people has been centered upon the deliberations of
those nine justices in Washington who make up our Supreme
Court with a consuming interest without parallel in the history
of this or any other country. In no other government the world
has yet seen, may one man, holding the balance of power upon
a judicial tribunal, control the vicissitudes of government and
the social and economic life of a whole people, as does the fifth
man making up the majority on the United States Supreme
Court, when the justices are closely divided upon some important issue. Not only is that true, but in no other country may
a unanimous judicial tribunal exercise such power. And while
it is true that at times in our own past history individual cases
of great moment have attracted almost universal interest, there
has never been a time when, over so long a period, litigation
involving such vital interests of all classes of our people, or of
such importance politically, socially, and economically, has kept
the spotlight in a way at all comparable to the present period.
A discussion of the United States Supreme Court and its
decisions (any case or cases) assumes a consideration of the
* Professor of Law, University of Missouri School of Law. A. B.
1917, A. M. 1918, LL. B. 1925, University of Missouri; S. J.D. 1933,
Harvard Law School.
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problems of constitutional law as developed by the Court in relation to the legislation involved in the case being adjudicated,
and may be materially assisted by some attention to the general
outlook and background of the justices, as well as by a study of
the nature of those provisions of the Constitution which they
are called upon to construe and apply. In fact, any intelligent
study or understanding of the functioning of the Supreme Court
necessitates some knowledge of the personnel of the Court, for
in no other type of adjudication, so much as in problems of constitutionality, does the personality of the judge count for so
much. The judges' early training and environment, economically, socially, and intellectually, and-as justices of the
United States Supreme Court seldom reach that position younger than about sixty-their whole life's experiences and associations have very definitely affected their outlook on most
social and economic problems, as well as political or governmental questions. This is not to say that the issues have been
prejudged, but their methods of approach to such problems and
their leanings, consciously or unconsciously, in favor of or
against proposed social, economic, or political changes are rather
definitely determined.
For want of a more accurate characterization we have come
to label these men as liberals and conservatives-dependent
largely upon their outlook with respect to social and economic
problems. At the present time the Court is less one-sided in its
division between these two groups than at most other times in
its history.
When legislation, state or federal, involving important
social or economic issues, comes before the Court, the chances
for approval by at least three members of the Court are likely
to be rather good. Justices Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo are
well known for their liberal tendencies and, like the late Mr.
Justice Holmes, are willing to allow the legislature a considerable degree of freedom to experiment with social and economic
problems, to which there are as yet no for-certain correct solutions.
With an equal degree of certainty, one may predict that at
least four members of the Court will register opposition to such
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legislation.1 The conservative outlook of Justices Van Devanter,
McReynolds, Sutherland, and Butler needs no particular comment to convince even a casual student of public affairs that
social and economic legislation is likely to have an uphill fight
to win their approval.
This is not to criticise either group, both of whom may be
admitted to be equally honest, equally sincere, and equally devoted to what they conceive to be the fundamental principles
of our constitutional system. But, as so admirably pointed out
by Dean Pound,2 there are certain elements or materials on the
basis of which or out of which judicial decisions are constructed,
which influence and control all judges-liberal and conservative
alike-yet allow the reaching of widely divergent conclusions.
They include a great mass of legal precepts; a body of traditional ideas as to how the legal precepts should be interpreted
and applied, together with a traditional technique of developing and applying them; and finally, and most important for this
discussion, a body of ideas and ideals as to the end and purpose of law. It is within this last element that room exists for
widely divergent conclusions. These ideas or ideals are intimately tied up with, or perhaps are a part of, the social and
political philosophy of each particular judge. His outlook with
respect to social and economic problems, based on training, environment, experience, and a thousand other things-the great
conglomerate of forces that cause men to think differently and
to arrive at different conclusions--dictate his conception of the
end and purpose of law, or the proper content to be read into
indefinite provisions of the Constitution such as the due process
clauses. The situation is well illustrated by Mr. Justice Cardozo
in his little book, "The Growth of the Law," where he discusses
the early attitude of certain courts toward workmen's compensation 3 and the divisions on the Supreme Court in cases like the
4
first minimum wage decision.
'This is, of course, a general statement and the specific provisions
of any particular piece of legislation may affect this probable attitude
of either group one way or the other.
2 The Theory of Judicial Decision (1923) 36 Harv. L. Rev. 641;
The Supreme Court and Minimum Wage Legislation (Introduction)
(1925). See also Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921),
and The Growth of the Law (1924).
3 Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431 (1911),
Matter of Jensen v. Southern Pacific Co., 215 N. Y. 514, 109 N. E. 600
(1915); New York Central Ry. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188 (1917).
4Adklns v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525 (1923).
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"What interests me most at the moment is that a problem in the
choice of methods lay back of the problem of law and determined its
solution. On the one hand the right of property, as it was known to
the fathers of the republic, was posited as permanent and absolute.
Impairment was not to be suffered except within the narrow limits
of history and precedent. No experiment was to be made along new
lines of social' betterment. The image was a perfect sphere. The least
dent or abraision was a subtraction from its essence. Given such
premises, the conclusion is inevitable. The statute becomes an
illegitimate assault upon rights assured to the individual against the
encroachments of society. . . . The opposing view, if it is to be
accepted, must be reached through other avenues of approach. The
right which the assailants of the statute posit as absolute or permanent is conceived of by the supporters of the statute as conditioned
by varying circumstances of time and space and environment and
degree. The limitations appropriate to one stage of development may
be inadequate for another. . . . The truth is not always to be
reached by looking backward to the beginning and deducing from the
source. The end may be frustrated unless we look forward to the
goal.'
The one group thinks in terms of a constitution directed

to the protection of property. The other sees the end and purpose of law, the function of a constitution, as the promotion of
social utility, the welfare of the community. All rights guar-

anteed by flexible and indefinite provisions in a constitution,
such as the due process clauses--whether property rights or

-whatnot-axe relative, not absolute.

Thus it is not surprising

that the Court divides into opposing groups, or that decisions

involving the constitutional validity of social and economic legislation are arrived at by sharp divisions.
The above mentioned division on the Court as presently

constituted leaves two members, sometimes called the variables,
occupying a position of somewhat more middle ground. Mr.
Chief Justice Hughes, with notable exceptions including the
A. A. A. case, 6 has indicated a greater inclination to align himself with the liberal than with the conservative

Court.

wing of the

This makes not improbable frequent even divisions and

leaves Mr. Justice Roberts, who earlier showed some very dis-

tinct signs of liberal tendencies, but who more than made up
for such tendencies in his later opinions, in a position of holding
the balance of power on closely contested issues.
Cardozo, The Growth of the Law (1924), 72, 74.
United States v. Butler, et al., Receivers of Hoosac Mills Corp.,
297 U. S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 312 (1936).
8
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When we further consider that the issues litigated in contested legislation of the type referred to commonly turn upon
provisions of the Constitution which have no certain, definite,
and well established meaning, the uncertainty of the result becomes assured, and the social and economic background and
predilections of the judges become all important factors. The
clauses of the Constitution most commonly involved in the type
of litigation to which reference has been made, are the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Nobody, not even the Supreme Court, has attempted to
define due process. The meaning of that important clause of
the Constitution is clarified-or confused as the case may bebit by bit as cases are decided, the Court authoritatively determining its application in the particular case, but nothing more.
The nature of the clause makes this more or less inevitable. It
is the expression of a broad general standard akin to that of
reasonableness in other fields of the law, and in sharp contrast
with the more definite and certain rules of law encountered, for
instance, in the domain of real property.
When the constitutional provisions controlling the powers
of government and determining the extent to which the individual is protected in his rights against the invasion of governmental power are thus flexible and indefinite, it is hardly surprising
that not a few students of constitutional law have been saying
for a good many years that the Constitution means what the
judges say it means.
During the present period of intense popular interest referred to, the Federal Government and many states have entered upon programs of social and economic legislation, at least
allegedly calculated to result in improving the conditions of life
for vast millions in our population not the most fortunately situated, which legislation has involved restrictions upon those
heretofore able, by virtue of their superior economic position,
largely to dominate our industrial and economic set-up, and
control the lives, in no small degree, of mi ions of people less
fortunately situated. Such legislation, from its first appearance, has always been fought with every possible resource by
those adversely affected by it, and the present forms no
exceptions.
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A study of the Supreme Court and the A. A. A. involves a
legislative similarity to that referred to as well as a constitutional
similarity. The legislation enacted was calculated to better the
economic conditions of millions of farmers as well as to rehabilitate a basic industry, the administration of which imposed certain burdens upon others more fortunately situated and brought
forth a determined effort to prevent the plan from being carried
to its intended goal. Passing judgment upon the validity of the
legislation involved required the interpretation and application
by the Supreme Court of a provision in our Constitution equally
as flexible and indefinite as the due process clauses.
For these reasons reference may not inappropriately be
made to two now famous and familiar cases decided at the 1933
term of the Supreme Court, involving state rather than federal
legislation, but which well illustrate the type of legislation and
the type of constitutional construction under consideration, and
which also mark the beginning of the present period of intense
popular interest in the decisions of the Supreme Court.
The Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium case,7 decided in January, 1934, involved a statute passed by the Minnesota legislature in 1933 for a temporary period of two years, which declared an emergency to exist and provided relief for debtors
against mortgage foreclosure by authorizing the courts to extend
the period of time in which the debtor might redeem his property from foreclosure sale, for such time as the court might deem
just and equitable in each case, not to exceed, of course, the twoyear period of the statute.8 Under the terms of the mortgage
contract entered into between the parties to the mortgage, the
creditor had a right to sell the property under foreclosure and
get his money. This right was a property right of which he was
deprived by the statute.
Two provisions of the federal Constitution were involved,
one which says "no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts" ;9 the other, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, "nor shall any state deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law". The
7Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398
(1934).
6 Minn. Laws 1933, c. 339, p. 514.
IArt. I, Sec. 10.
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latter, it has been suggested, is the expression of a general standard, a very flexible clause without certain and definite meaning.
It is true, the creditor would be deprived of a property rightbut is it without due process of law? Not if there is sufficient
justification or necessity in the interest of the public for it, and
that is determined, somewhat at least, by weighing the public
need to be served by the act against the extent to which the
creditor's rights are invaded. Here, because of the stringent
emergency among farmers in an agricultural state, and as the
statute made careful provision to protect the interests of the
creditor in the meantime by requiring a reasonable rental to be
paid and applied to defraying interest charges, insurance, etc.,
upon the property, the interference with the property rights of
the creditor was held not to be without due process of law.
The constitutional provision that "no state shall pass any
law impairing the obligation of contracts" sounds like a very
definite and certain provision, but, like the due process clause,
it has always been construed to be somewhat flexible, and if a
state, in the reasonable exercise of its police power for the protection of the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of its
inhabitants, enacts legislation that interferes with the enjoyment
of contract rights, such legislation will be sustained despite the
contracts clause.10 Said Mr. Justice Brown, speaking for a
unanimous Court in Manigault v. Springs:"l
"It is the settled law of this court that the interdiction of statutes

Impairing the obligation of contracts does not prevent the state from
exercising such powers as are vested in it for the promotion of the
common weal, or are necessary for the general good of the public,
though contracts previously entered into between individuals may
be thereby affected. This power . . . to protect the lives, health,
morals, comfort, and general welfare of the people . . . is para-

mount to any rights under contracts between individuals."

Any literal interpretation of the contracts clause would have
outlawed the moratorium statute, but it was held to be a reason2"When the provisions of the Constitution, in grant or restriction, are specific, so particularized as not to admit of construction, no
question Is presented. Thus, emergency would not permit a state to

have

more

than

two senators.

.

.

. But, where constitutional

grants and limitations of power are set forth in general clauses, which
afford a broad outline, the process of construction is essential to fill
in the details. That is true of the contract clause." Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes in Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S.
398, 426 (1934).
"199 U. S. 473, 480 (1905).
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able police measure, justified in the interest of relieving a serious
economic emergency. Never before with the possible exception
of the emergency rent law cases, 12 had the Court gone so far in
allowing legislation to interfere with contracts where health,
morals, or safety (the traditional bases for the exercise of the
police power) were not involved. It marked the recognition that
economic needs may be a justification equally with health, morals,
and safety.
This was one of the first in the series of laws passed by the
states calculated to better the condition of the economically unfortunate, and the decision sustaining it, taking away as it did
some of the power of the economically more fortunate to profit
by the plight of his debtor, and expressly extending the police
power of the states to the protection of economic needs, constitutes a landmark in the development of our constitutional law.
The opinion in that case asserted that mere historical inquiry into the supposed intention of the framers of the Constitution regarding economic problems of 1934, manifestly beyond
their possible contemplation, was not a safe method of constitutional construction. Any safe principle of constitutional construction, the Court emphasized, must take into consideration
the social and economic conditions and needs of the time and
plac -- a constitution must adapt itself to present day needs. In
no other way can social, economic, and governmental breakdown
be avoided. The opinion quoted the now famous assertion of
Mr. Chief Justice Marshall that, "A constitution (is) intended
to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, .. . (must) be
adapted to the various crisis of human affairs."1 3 A Constitution that is not flexible and cannot be readily adjusted to meet
the needs of changing conditions cannot thus endure.
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes wrote the majority opinion in this
case, speaking for himself and Mr. Justice Roberts, as well as
the three liberals-Justices Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo. Any
such doctrine as he asserted, keeping the Constitution attuned
to changing social and economic conditions and needs, hardly
accords with the conception of the four most conservative members of the Court. They dissented in an opinion by Mr. Justice
-'Blockv. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135 (1921); Marcus Brown Holding
I'McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 415 (1819).

Co. v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 170 (1921).
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Sutherland, warning, substantially, that the end of constitutional government was "just around the corner".
The second case, illustrative of desirable methods of construction and interpretation to be applied to flexible and indefinite provisions of the Constitution, and again representing a
part in such a state program as referred to above, was the socalled New York AMlk case.' 4
There was involved New York's attempt, again for a temporary emergency period, to control the price of milk for the purpose of salvaging the dairy-farming industry,' 5 "a paramount
industry of the state" which constituted so fundamental a link
in her chain of economic stability. No other legislation has been
more jealously restricted than price regulation. Never before
had a regulation of prices for an ordinary commodity, not subject to monopolistic control, been sustained by the Court.' 6 In
a well reasoned opinion, 'Mr. Justice Roberts, speaking for the
same five justices who had sustained the MIinnesota Moratorium
statute, upheld the power of New York, because of the importance of the dairy industry to the economic life of the state, and
partially and indirectly, to safeguard the public health by insuring a safe milk supply. This case constituted, perhaps, the
most far-reaching and liberal construction of the due process
clause yet announced by the Supreme Court. It appeared to
overrule, siib silentio, among others, the New State Ice Company
eae' 7 by adopting the method of approach and the point of view
of Mr. Justice Brandeis' able dissent in that case, and to expand
the field for price control to ordinary commodities whenever, in
the opinion of the legislature and of the Court, a sufficient need
therefor was found to exist.
"The phrase 'affected with a public interest'," said Mr. Justice
Roberts, "can, in the nature of things, mean no more than that the
Industry, for adequate reason is subject to control for the public good
. . . There can be no doubt that upon proper occasion and by appropriate measures the state may regulate the business in any of its
aspects, including the prices to be charged for the products or commodities it sells. So far as the requirement of due process is concerned,

. .

. a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy

11Nebbia v. People of State of New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934).
'IN. Y. Laws 1933, c. 158.
16 O. American Coal Mining

Co. v. Special Coal and Food Commission of Indiana, 268 Fed. 563 (D. C. Ind. 1920).
"New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U. S. 262 (1932).
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may reasonably be deemed to promote the public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose."'1

The same four justices who dissented so vigorously in the
Moratorium case found themselves equally unable to follow the
majority, and joined in an opinion by Mr. Justice McReynolds
which made the startling assertion that, "plainly ...this Court
must have regard to the wisdom of the enactment."19 The assertion was startling, not because the Court had never been known
to consider the wisdom of an enactment in passing upon its constitutional validity, but because never before had a justice of the
Supreme Court, or perhaps of any other court, admitted as much.
These two cases were epoch-making in the development of
our constitutional system, and appeared to stamp Mr. Chief
Justice Hughes and Mr. Justice Roberts as much more liberal
than the most ardent liberals had dared to hope they might be.
While there are many cases between these two and that invalidating the A. A. A. which might further illustrate the type
of problem here involved, and which would trace the developments revealing Mir. Justice Roberts' later abode with the
conservative wing of the Court, such as the Railroad Retirement
case, 20 these two suffice to show the possibilities for diverse judicial attitude when social or economic legislation is under consideration, and when uncertainty is made more uncertain by the
necessity of construing and applying flexible and indefinite provisions of the Constitution.
A discussion of the Supreme Court and the A. A. A. 21 does
not necessitate any detailed setting out of the Act of Congress, 22
familiar in its general aspects to most students of public affairs.
The purpose of the act was to assist in general economic recovery
by the rehabilitation of agriculture throughout the country, to
be accomplished by establishing a balance between the production and consumption of agricultural commodities that was intended to bring the price of farm products back to the 19091914 level. To bring this about the Secretary of Agriculture
Lm Nebbia v. People, 291 U. S. 502, 536, 537 (1934).
"Id.
at 556.
2'Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Ry. Co., 295 U. S. 330
(1935).
2United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 312 (1936).
'Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 31, 7 U. S. C. A.
26 (1933).
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was authorized to enter into agreements -with farmers to reduce
production of certain specified "basic" agricultural commodities in return for "rental or benefit payments" to them, in such
amounts as the Secretary might deem fair and reasonable.
Mloney to make these "rental or benefit payments" was to be
obtained by taxes levied upon the first processors of the commodities in question.
In what may be recorded by future historians as one of the
most far-reaching pronouncements by the United States Supreme
Court in the first century and a half of its existence, Mr. Justice
Roberts, speaking for six members of the Court,23 read an
opinion which destroyed substantially the whole of the Agricultural Adjustment program, forecasting a like doom for numerous other important legislative acts.
That five members of the Court would hold the original
Agricultural Adjustment Act involved in the Hoosac Mills case
unconstitutional was not entirely unexpected. That Mr. Chief
Justice Hughes would join them in such holding was a subject
of legitimate speculation. But that the opinion should completely ignore the issue of delegation of legislative power, which
was the principal basis for the holding of invalidity below, 24 and
make its decision so broad and sweeping as to shatter beyond any
immediate prospect of redemption all existing legislative attempts to put agriculture on a basis of partial equality with the
favored and powerful manufacturer and industrialist, was
entirely unexpected. To millions of farmers in this country, together with many other millions sharing a similar viewpoint, the
decision appeared to mark the complete destruction of the most
important part of what many of them considered the first constructive legislative program ever directed to the substantial betterment of their economic condition, while the manufacturer and
the industrialist continued to profit, by a high protective tariff.
What the consequences of that feeling in terms of agrarian unrest
might have been had prompt efforts not been directed to the substitution of some constructive remedy, 25 no one can say.
2 Justices Roberts, Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, and
Butler, and Mr. Chief Justice Hughes.
- 4Butler v. United States, 78 1. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 1st, 1935).
Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act, 16 U. S. C. A.
590 G (1936), approved February 29, 1936. The decision invalidating
the A. A. A. was handed down January 6, 1936. This act omits the

K. L. J.-2

KENTUCKY LAw JOURNAL

Whether the Agricultural Adjustment Act represented wise
economic or social policy, or the opposite, whether desirable or
highly undesirable, is no concern of the present article. Any
study of problems of constitutionality, whether by judges or
other students of constitutional law, should look only to the existence or lack of constitutional power. From such a point of view
a profound interest for every careful student of constitutional
law arises as to what the decision in the A. A. A. case means for
constitutional development in this country.
The Constitution, Article I, Section 8, provides that "Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts,
and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense
and general welfare of the United States . . . ."--the so-called
general welfare clause. The controlling issue, said the Court,
was whether this provision had the effect of authorizing the expenditure, in the way provided by Congress, of the funds raised
by the processing taxes.
It is to be noted that the general welfare clause, thus made
the determining factor in the case, is without certain and definite
meaning, and is subject to diverse constructions and interpretations-in short, is flexible and indefinite in much the same
fashion as the due process clause, and should be construed and
interpreted with the same caution lest its application be unduly
restricted. It can, at best, like the due process clause, involve
only a matter of judgment and opinion, and is almost always certain to be tied up with matters of policy, and a court should be
careful in its application of the clause not to assume the policy
determining function which has been vested by the Constitution
in other hands.
Three conceivable interpretations have been advanced in the
past. In the first place it was early suggested that this clause
was meant to confer upon Congress a substantive power to legiscontract feature of its predecessor in an effort to avoid the objections
of the Supreme Court, and also eliminates the tax provisions in an
obvious effort to bring any later case within the doctrine of Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923), that a taxpayer's interest in
appropriations from the general treasury is so remote and indirect
that he has no standing in court to challenge their constitutionality.
For a discussion of the A. A. A. case in the light of that doctrine,
see Collier, Judicia Bootstraps and the GeneraZ Welfare Clause: The
A. A. A. Opinion (1936), 4 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 211.
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late generally for the general welfare. 20 Such a construction
would have given to Congress a general power equivalent to the
police power of the states and would have rendered entirely useless the subsequent enumeration of special powers conferred
upon Congress. Under this interpretation little if anything
would have been left of the doctrine that Congress is a body of
limited powers. Little serious support for this construction ever
existed.
Chiefly under the leadership of Madison, it was contended
that the clause should be restricted by that which follows, and
that the power of Congress to tax and spend should be limited to
the purposes specifically set forth in the enumeration of powers
conferred upon Congress.2-7 Such a construction would have
the effect, of course, of rendering entifely nugatory the mention
of general welfare; and, since power to lay and collect taxes and
appropriate the money so collected is implied in the special powers expressly granted (certainly with, and probably without the
"necessary and proper" clause of the same section), it would
restrict the power of Congress to tax and spend to what it would
have been had the entire clause of Article I, Section 8, been
omitted.
Alexander Hamilton, whose views were later supported by
Story, 2 8 took a position somewhat between these two extremes
and advocated a construction which, unlike the first view, according a complete and unrestricted power to legislate for the
general welfare, would nevertheless give to Congress a substantive power to tax and spend for-the general welfare, thus in contrast with Madison's view making that power a mere incident of
2
the later enumerated powers. 0
2 See 1 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution (3d ed. 1859),
Ch. XIV, p. 629, and authorities there collected.
MId. at 631 et seq.; The Federalist, No. XLI, 326 et seq. For a
rather detailed discussion of the circumstances that led up to the inclusion of this clause in the Constitution, see the letter of Madison
to Andrew Stevenson of November 17, 1830, and other writings published In 3 Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention (1911),
483-494.
Story, Commentaries on the Constitution (3d ed. 1858), Ch.
is
XIV, 639, et seq.
2 For recent discussions of the opposing theories originally advcoated by Hamilton and Madison, see McGuire, The Mew Deal and
the Public Money (1935), 23 Geo. L. J. 155; Post, The Constitutionality
of Government Spen ing for the General Welfare (1935), 22 Va. L.
Rev. L

KENTUCKY LAW JOUNAL

The Court did lip service to this doctrine of Hamilton and
Story that the general welfare clause is not without meaning,
and that it does confer a power separate and distinct from the
later enumerated powers, on the basis of which Congress has a
substantive power to tax and to appropriate, limited only by the
requirement that such powers shall be exercised to provide for
the general welfare of the United States, as distinguished from
local welfare.
This, at first glance, looked like a determination of farreaching importance. Throughout the period of our history there
have never ceased to be exponents 3 of the doctrine of Madison
that the general welfare clause, in effect, had no purpose except
to occupy space, and that the power to tax is directly limited to
what is incident to the execution of the other enumerated powers
of Congress, a power which the majority admits Congress clearly
would have had without the general welfare clause. Laudable
as may be this assertion of the Court that the Constitution
means what it says, those who look for constitutional interpretation, not in what the Court says by way of generalities in its introductory remarks, but in the concrete application of constitutional provisions to the facts of a particular case being adjudicated, must find small comfort in that which follows.
After giving meaning to the general welfare clause as just
indicated and reasserting the time honored principles-now perhaps as frequently honored in their breach as in their observance
-that a strong presumption of constitutionality is to be indulged and an act of Congress is to be declared invalid only if
the Court is inevitably impelled to that conclusion by the clear
and controlling provisions of the Constitution, and that a court
is never to concern itself with the wisdom or policy of a legislative act,3 1 the majority came near doing exactly what it condemned in an opinion holding the legislative act unconstitutional
"0Post, Op. cit., supra, note 29.
31"When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the
courts as not conforming to the constitutional mandate the judicial
branch of the government has only one duty,-to lay the article of
the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is
challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the former.
. . . The court neither approves nor condemns any legislative
policy." Mr. Justice Roberts in United States v. Butler, 56 S. Ct. 312,
318 (1936). Cf. Mr. Justice McReynolds' assertion in his dissent in
Nebbia v. People, 291 U. S. 502, 556 (1934), cited note 19, supra.

Ti
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in such sweeping terms as to make of doubtful validity any attempt to bring about a solution of the indistiutably national
problem created by the condition of maladjustment under which
our agricultural system previously had been struggling with
rapidly increasing difficulty for some years past.
After admitting that Congress, under Article I, Section 8,
of the Constitution, has a substantive power to lay and collect
taxes to provide for the general welfare, the Court prefaced the
principal part of its opinion with the assertion that the processing taxes, being mere expropriations of money from one group for
the benefit of another, are not in reality taxes at all and are thus
invalid, though similar expropriations from one group for the
benefit of another would be valid in the case of a protective tariff
(without using the words "protective tariff"). 32 But since that
is not the basis upon which the decision is made to turn, perhaps
it may be laid on one side as of comparatively small importance.
When Mr. Justice Roberts started out by an interpretation
of the general welfare clause, giving it the content and meaning
he did, he was certainly on safe constitutional ground and his
reasoning must command the respect of all. And he did more.
He pointed out the wide range that must be allowed to the legislature under a clause of such broad and general meaning. "How
great," he asserted, "is the extent of that range, when the subject is the promotion of the general welfare of the United States,
we need hardly remark." When a question of constitutionality
comes here, he asserted, "we naturally require a showing that by
no reasonable possibility can the challenged legislation fall with33
in the wide range of discretion permitted to the Congress."
His next logical inquiry would seem to have been, whether or not
such a program for the rehabilitation of agriculture, under existing conditions, so far affected the public welfare as to bring it
within the general welfare clause, thus interpreted, as a purpose
for which the power of taxation might be exercised. Once

'-"We may concede that the latter sort of imposition (expropriation of money from one group for the benefit of another) is constitutional when imposed to effectuate regulation of a matter in which
both groups are interested and in respect of which there is a power
of legislative regulation." 56 S. Ct. 312, 317 (1936).

For a discussion of the A. A. A. decision with special reference
to the protective tariff, see Hart, Processing Taxes and Protective
Tariffs (1936), 49 Harv. L. Rev. 610.
56 S. Ct. 312, 320 (1936).
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having posed that inquiry he might have had considerable difficulty in avoiding a conclusion contrary to that which the majority opinion announced.
It is just possible that he might have found, either that the
rehabilitation of agriculture is a purely local matter and so far
unrelated to the general (national) welfare as to place it beyond
the scope of the general welfare clause, or he might have said
that while this was a legitimate purpose within the scope of the
general welfare clause, the particular program set up by the
legislation under consideration was a purely arbitrary and unreasonable imposition which could not by any "reasonable possibility" effect the announced purpose. To have done either, in
the face of existing realities, would have required considerable
courage. A third possibility may suggest itself. He might have
found this to have been a provision for the general welfare but
asserted that it so far invaded the power of the states that it
ought not be permitted to stand, in which case he must of necessity have shown some sound constitutional basis for distinguishing this from other familiar exercises of enumerated powers that
effect a regulation, which, standing alone, is reserved to the
states. This, likewise, would have been beset with no little
difficulty.
He elected to embrace none of these possibilities. Whether
because the current of his reasoning was sweeping him to a destination at which he did not wish to arrive, or for other reasons
not announced, he changed his course in mid-stream, so to speak.
He asserted that the purpose of the Act (and apparently its ultimate end as well) was to control agricultural production within
the states-a purely local matter-and whether the taxes were in
reality taxes or not, and whether truly for the general welfare
or not, they were nevertheless invalid because the tax was but a
step in a general plan, which as a whole invaded the rights of the
states by attempting to control agricultural production. The
Court bluntly made the gratuitous assertion that "powers not
granted are prohibited. None to regulate agricultural production is given, and therefore legislation by Congress for that purpose is forbidden." '
I4bid.
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But power to tax and spend3 5 to provide for the general
welfare is granted to Congress. With respect to every other
enumerated power the Supreme Court has always held that the
enumerated power includes, by implication, such other powers
as are necessary and proper to make the granted power effective,
i. e., the power to so formulate its legislative enactment as to
achieve effectively the intended purpose. Here the ultimate end
was indisputably the promotion of the general welfare by the use
of public funds to rehabilitate agriculture on a national scale.
Certain restrictions upon agricultural production were set up
by way of conditions to the receipt of the rental or benefit payments. These were conceived, however, as incidents to the
broader plan to provide for the general welfare, and not as a
regulation of agriculture as such. The Court in effect said that
while as to all other enumerated powers, incidental powers to
make the granted powers effective are properly to be implied,
not so under the grant of power to provide for the general welfare by the use of the public money. There it reasoned as if the
Tenth Amendment 36 contained the word "expressly", in which
case it could well have said that "powers not (expressly) granted
are prohibited. None to regulate agricultural production is
(expressly) given, and therefore legislation by Congress for that
purpose is forbidden." 3 7 But the Articles of Confederation did
contain the term "expressly delegated" in defining the powers
which alone Congress had. 38 The Constitutional Convention
omitted any such clause and inserted the "necessary and proper"
clause 39 instead. The Congress which proposed the Tenth
31Everyone, including the Court, admits that while the terms
spend" or "appropriate" are not used, they are implied in the constitutional grant of the taxing power. Id. at 319; United States v.
Realty Co., 163 U. S. 427 (1896).
""The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively or to the people."
Cf. Mr. Justice Roberts' statement, 56 S. Ct. 312, 320, quoted
In text at note 34, supra.
"'Articles of Confederation, Art. II. "Each state retains its
sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every power, jurisdiction
and right which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to
the United States, in Congress assembled."
-' "The Congress shall have power . . . to make all laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in
the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer
thereof."-Art. I, Sec. 8, par. 18.
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Amendment to the states for ratification-a Congress filled incidentally with members of the Constitutional Convention-re40
jected a proposal to include the phrase "expressly delegated",
in that amendment. In view of these historical facts, the uniform construction recognizing implied powers would seem to be
amply justified. 41 That any reason exists for making an exception in the case of the granted power to tax and spend for the
general welfare is by no means demonstrated by the Court. The
reasoning of Mr. Justice Roberts at this point is not greatly
unlike that of Mr. Chief Justice Taney in the unfortunate Dred
Scott case by which he arrived at the conclusion that the grant
in the Constitution to Congress of the broad and plenary power
to govern territories did not include the power to prohibit slavery
42
therein.
In this general connection it should be observed in passing
that the Tenth Amendment reserves to the states "powers not
delegated to the United States" 43 and not broad general subjects
or fields of governmental action. It is freely admitted that no
general power to regulate agricultural production in the nature
of a police power is granted to Congress, yet it does not necessarily follow that the subject of agricultural production may not
be reached by some other power of Congress-here the power
to tax and spend for the general welfare, including the contractual conditions incident to the grant of the public funds.
A general regulatory power of a police nature would imply the
possibility of penal sanctions for disobedience, and would be
based on a specific grant like that of power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. But the contractual purchase of
compliance with a general program such as involved in the instant case, may be a proper incident to the granted power to tax
and spend for the general -welfare. The admission that Congress
is not granted and has no general regulatory power over agricultural production within the states does not in the least militate
against the soundness of this conclusion. This is not the exercise
of the same power but is the incidental effect of the exercise of a
4 Annals of First Congress, August 18, 1789.
O Mr. Chief Justice Marshall definitely established for all time
the doctrine of implied powers in such cases as McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819), and Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824).
"Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393, 451, 452 (1856).
43Tenth Amendment, quoted note 36, supra.
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distinct and granted power upon a subject over which no direct
national regulatory power exists. Probably little more than a
mere statement of the facts in the two situations is needed to
convince most unprejudiced students of this problem that the
making of benefit payments to induce curtailment of production, only partially effective under the A. A. A. as demonstrated
by Air. Justice Stone's dissent, is hardly the same thing as an act
prohibiting production beyond a stipulated maximum with a fine
or jail sentence as the penalty for disobedience. With equal
ease it would seem to follow that the two powers, if exercised,
must spring from different sources and the restrictions upon the
44
one would not necessarily mark the limits of the other.
After the Court discloses its discovery that the Constitution
contains no grant to Congress of a power to regulate agricultural
production within the states, the reader of the opinion is given
the rather astonishing information, at least by very definite implication, that this case is on a par with and controlled by the
Child Labar Tax Case.45 In that case the so-called tax was held
to be not a tax, but in reality a penalty for deviation from a
prescribed course of conduct. The basis of similarity between
the cases, the Court was content to leave to the reader's own
imagination. That what the Court found to be a penalty in that
case, imposed upon the manufacturer for failure to conform to
a course of conduct prescribed by the statute, was the same in
nature and effect as the processing tax here imposed, not upon
the farmer whose conduct it was hoped to influence but upon one
whose only conduct to be controlled was the payment of the tax,
could hardly, it would seem, be seriously contended.
Being unwilling to press its claim that the processing tax
was not really a tax, or that it was on a par with the penalty in
I "It is obvious that the government of the Union, in the exercise
of its express powers . . . may use means that may also be employed by a state in the exercise of its acknowledged powers. .
.
So if a state, in passing laws on subjects acknowledged to be within
its control, and with a view to those subjects, shall adopt a measure
of the same character with one which Congress may adopt, it does
not derive its authority from the particular power which has been
granted, but from some other which remains with the state, and may
be executed by the same means. All experience shows that the same
measures, or measures scarcely distinguishable from each other, may
flow from distinct powers; but this does not prove that the powers
themselves are identical". Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v.
Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 204 (1824).
,1Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20 (1922).
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the Child Labor Tax Case, as the remainder of the opinion demonstrates, the Court next asserted that the plan of regulation
involved was not voluntary but coercive and compulsory and
thus beyond the power of Congress. Regulation that does not
require compliance would hardly seem to be regulation, so the
element of compulsion would seem to be important to the result
toward which the Court was obviously directing its efforts.
The plan, thus declared to be compulsory in its nature,
authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to enter into agreements
with the farmers whereby the latter agreed to reduce production
in return for the so-called rental or benefit payments to be made
out of money raised by the processing taxes.
The Court made the rather damaging admission that the
farmer was at liberty to comply or refuse to comply as he might
see fit (previously believed to indicate the opposite of coercion),
but, said the Court, since by refusal to comply the farmer would
lose the benefits he would otherwise obtain, and since the amount
offered was intended to be sufficient to cause him to agree, it
amounted to coercion. Anticipating the very obvious answer to
this assertion, the Court hastened to assure us that, "the coercive
purpose and intent of the statute is not obscured by the fact that
it has not been entirely successful. "4
The facts are that as to cotton, which was involved in this
case, although the act became effective in June, 1933, more than
six and one-fourth millions of acres of productive cotton land
did not participate in the plan in 1934, and nearly three millions
of acres did not participate in 1935. Put differently, of the one
and one-half millions of farmers in the United States growing
cotton, thirty-three per cent. did not participate in 1934 and
7
thirteen per cent. did not in 1935.4
Even more significant is the fact that because the A. A. A.
plan did lack coercive features and was not sufficiently effective,
the Bankhead Cotton Control Act 48 was passed in 1934 imposing
a tax of fifty per cent. on all cotton produced in excess of certain
prescribed limits, the purpose being, as clearly set out in the
debates on the Bankhead Bill in Congress, 49 to prevent the non- 56 S. Ct. 312, 321 (1936).
4"See Mr. Justice Stone's dissent, id. at 326.
I 48 Stat. 598; 7 U. S. C. A. 701 (1934).
See Hearing before Committee on Agriculture, U. S. Senate,
S. 1974, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess.; Hearing before Committee on Agri-
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cooperating growers from increasing their plantings in order to
capitalize upon the price advances that had resulted from the
reduction in acreage made by contract signers.5 0
It is, to say the least, a bit disconcerting, to observe the
same Court, by substantially the same majority, asserting, in
effect, that an unemployed, penniless widow, with dependent
children, stands on a plane of free bargaining equality with the
employment manager of a fifty million dollar corporation, and
that their complete freedom of contract with respect to wages
cannot be regulated by an exercise of the police power of the
state, 5 ' and at the same time finding unconstitutional coercion
in the mere offering of a possibly alluring contract which, by the
Court's own admission, the farmer was free to accept or reject
as might appear to his advantage.
Equally striking by way of contrast is the Court's earlier
decision that a state legislature could not be permitted to interfere with the free and equal bargaining of the two parties to a
labor contract, when the employer, by his superior economic position, was able to induce the employee to sign an agreement not
to join a labor union as the price of obtaining employment. 52
As if sensing the weakness of its holding with respect to
coercion, the Court moved on to its last stand, namely, that
whether compulsory or voluntary, it was nevertheless beyond
the power of Congress because by offering inducements in the
form of rental or benefit payments, the farmer was induced to
enter into an agreement to comply with the plan of acreage
reduction.
Congress has no power directly to compel reduction in acreage. Under the A. A. A., by means of a contract arrangement
and the use of federal funds, the National Government induced
culture, U. S. House of Representatives, H. R. 8402, 73rd Cong., 2nd
Sess.; Senate Report No. 283, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 3; House
Report No. 867, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 3.
5 Report of Department of Agriculture on administration of Agri-

cultural Adjustment Act, Jan., 1935, p. 50.

r' Morehead v. People ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U. S. 587, 56 S. Ct. 918
(1936), the New York Minimum Wage Case where the same personnel
made up the majority, except that Mr. Chief Justice Hughes joined
the dissenting group.
1Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1 (1915). Only two of the present
membership of the Court took part in the majority ruling in the
Coppage case, Justices Van Devanter and McReynolds.
Mr. Chief
Justice Hughes, then an associate justice, dissented.
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compliance with a plan of crop control which it had no power
directly to command. This, said the Court, constituted an invasion of state rights and was unconstitutional, and the processing
taxes, being but parts of the plan, were illegal.
What the ultimate consequences of this decision may be, it
is difficult to say. Does it mean as suggested by the dissent,
that all of the acts of Congress, such as the creation of the Departments of Agriculture and Labor for which there is no grant
in the Constitution, through all that long line of measures appropriating federal funds for the relief of human suffering and
misfortune, as in the ease of earthquake or flood, the suppression
of plant and animal disease or the eradication of pests in aid of
agriculture, the fostering of education, agricultural, rural, or
otherwise, and scores of other things, because coupled with some
requirement to insure the wise application of the funds, rest
upon an insecure constitutional foundation? The dissent in this
connection seems entirely sound when it asserts that,
"if the expenditure is for a national public purpose, that purpose will
not be thwarted because payment is on condition which will advance
that purpose. The action which Congress induces by payments of
money to promote the general welfare, but which it does not command
or coerce, is but an incident to a specifically granted power, but a
permissible means to a legitimate end. '""

The Court purported to find a distinction, perhaps of doubtful validity, between the situation under the A. A. A. and other
acts conferring bounties, as in counection with agricultural education, fighting boll weevil, etc., in that as to the latter there is
an appropriation upon condition, while in the former the recipient assumes a contractual obligation to comply.
Lastly, as in the Child Labor Tax Case relied upon, the
Court asserted that if this Act of Congress could stand, the way
was opened for Congress to assume control of any and all local
matters, to the ultimate destruction of the forty-eight states.
Interesting light is shed upon Mr. Justice Roberts' conception of what are local as distinguished from national problems by
his assertion that "it does not help to declare that local conditions throughout the nation have created a situation of national
concern; for this is but to say that whenever there is a widespread similarity of local conditions, Congress may ignore con"56 S. Ct. 312, 328 (1936).
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stitutional limitations upon its own powers and usurp those reserved to the state."54
To assert that the universal economic strangulation of the
most basic and fundamental industry throughout the whole country is nothing more than the similarity of local conditions, explains a great deal about the attitude of the Court which previously may have been difficult to understand. A certain editorial writer has possibly not exaggerated in asserting that under
such reasoning, "Noah's flood was solely of local concern, since
at each spot on the earth only one spot was under water,"",
though perhaps it would be admitted that the similarity of the
local conditions was rather striking and widespread.
The majority opinion ends with a long list of possible abuses
of the taxing and spending power, if the present act were upheld,
such as might result in the complete destruction of local self government. It asserted that in the name of the general welfare of
the United States-aptly described as "an indestructible union
of indestructible states"-there might be brought about an
obliteration of the constituent members of that union.
In one of the most brilliant dissenting opinions to be found
in the literature of the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Stone, speaking for himself and Justices Brandeis and Cardozo, found ample
constitutional basis for the power which Congress sought to
exercise.
He started his dissent with a masterly admonition to the
Court to stay within its proper judicial province.
"The power of the courts to declare a statute unconstitutional,"
he admonished, "is subject to two guiding principles of decision
which ought never to be absent from judicial consciousness. One is
that courts are concerned only with the power to enact statutes, not
with their wisdom. The other is that while unconstitutional exercise
of power by the executive and legislative branches of the government
is subject to judicial restraint, the only check upon our own (the
Court's) exercise of power is our own sense of self restraint."r'

The fundamental character and abiding importance of these
admonitions to the Court, it is impossible to overemphasize.
He pointed out that the constitutional power of Congress to
levy an excise tax upon the processing of -agricultural products
was not questioned by the majority, and he might.have added,
" Id. at 323.
16Irving Brant, St. Louis Star-Times, Jan. 8, 1936.

56 S. Ct. 312, 325 (1936).
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was beyond question. Further, he conceived that the levy in
question was held invalid, not for any want of power in Congress
to lay such a tax to defray public expenditures including those
for the general welfare, but because the use to which the proceeds were put was disapproved by the Court.
In what was probably intended as an answer to Mr. Justice
Roberts' intimation that the needs of agriculture were matters
of purely local concern, he asserted that, as the existing depressed state of agriculture was nation-wide in its extent and
effects, there certainly could be no basis for saying that the expenditure of public money in aid of farmers was not within the
specifically granted power of Congress to levy taxes to "provide
for the ... general welfare".
The pivot on which the decision of the majority was made to
turn, the dissent pointed out, was that a levy unquestionably
within the taxing power of Congress might be treated as invalid because it was considered a step in a plan to regulate agricultural production and for that reason a forbidden infringement of state power. But the levy of the processing taxes, said
Mr. Justice Stone, was none the less an exercise of the taxing
power because intended to defray an expenditure for the general
welfare rather than in the execution of some other enumerated
power of the federal government. And the levy and collection
of the tax in itself did not constitute regulation.
The tax was thought to be completely unlike the penalties
held invalid in the Child Labor Tax Case, relied on by the majority, because there the so-called tax was itself treated as the instrument of regulation by virtue of its coercive effect over conduct with respect to matters reserved to the control of the states.
In that case failure to follow the prescribed course of conduct in
a local enterprise subjected one to the payment of a destructively burdensome tax. Here the farmer changed his course of conduct, if at all, by the expectation of improvement of economic
conditions in the agricultural industry, and the promise of some
ready money in the meantime. "Threat of loss, not hope of
gain," said Mr. Justice Stone, "is the essence of economic

coercion.'

'7

What is perhaps the most significant aspect of the case as
ITId. at 326.
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decided by the majority is set out in bold relief by Mr. Justice
Stone when he asserts that,
"while the Constitution gives Congress, in specific and unambiguous
terms, the power to tax and spend," according to the majority ruling
"that power is subject to limitations which do not find their origin in
any express provision of the Constitution and to which other expressly delegated powers are not subject."58

The ultimate and most fundamental clash between the
majority and minority opinions is best illustrated in this conneetion by Mr. Justice Stone's comparison of the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce or to impose customs duties,
with the power to lay and collect taxes to provide for the general
welfare. All three were admitted by the majority to be substantive powers expressly conferred upon Congress by the Constitution.
As to the last power-to lay and collect taxes to provide for
the general welfare-just as in the case of the other two, the
majority admitted that the constitutional provision confers a
substantive power, not limited to being exercised as incidental
to the later enumerated powers, as was contended for by attorneys for the processors.
For the last 118 years, since the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in the famous case of McCulloch v. Maryland,5 9 it
had been uniformly recognized that enumerated powers carry
with them such incidental powers as may be necessary and
proper to make the granted powers effective, and in a most farreaching opinion that doctrine was recently reasserted in its
full vigor by the Court in the Gold Cases. 60
Applying that hitherto universally recognized doctrine to
the three powers under discussion, Mr. Justice Stone pointed out
that under the power to levy customs duties on imports, Congress has built up or destroyed local industries by the raising or
the lowering of the tariffs. Under its power to regulate interstate commerce, Congress, acting through the Interstate Commerce Commission, has set aside intrastate rates or regulated
3Id. at 327.
6'4
Wheat. 316 (1819).
6
*Norman v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 294 U. S. 240 (1935); Nortz
v. United States, 294 U. S. 317 (1935); Perry v. United States, 294
U. S. 330 (1935).
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intrastate traffic.6 1 None of these are powers granted to Congress and all are powers belonging to the states, but because
reasonably incident to the granted power, and reasonably necessary to make the granted power effective, they may be exercised,
though standing alone they are clearly beyond the power of Congress. With equal accuracy as compared with his assertion of
an absence of Congressional power to regulate agricultural production, Mr. Justice Roberts might assert that "powers not
granted are prohibited. None to regulate intrastate rates or
build up a local industry is given, therefore legislation by Congress for those purposes is forbidden." 6 2
At this point it should be noted that any such action, when
taken by Congress, supersedes any action by the states with
respect to the same subject, 63 by virtue of that provision in the
Constitution which says that "this Constitution, and the laws
of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof
..shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every
state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or
laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.' '"6
In the case of the taxing and spending power-likewise
enumerated and, so far as appears from its wording or position
in the Constitution, on a par with the customs and commerce
powers just referred to-no similar incidental power to make
the granted power effective exists, according to the majority.
As Mr. Justice Stone asserted, "it is a contradiction in terms to
say that there is," distinct from and independent of the other
enumerated powers, the "power to" tax and "spend for the
national welfare, while rejecting any power to impose conditions
Q!Minnesota Rate Cases (Simpson, et al. v. Shepard), 230 U. S.
352 (1913); Shreveport Rate Cases (Houston, East & West Texas
Ry. Co. v. United States), 234 U. S. 342 (1914); Illinois Central Ry.
v. Public Utilities Comm., 245 U. S. 493 (1918); Railroad Comm. of
Wis. v. C. B. & Q. Ry., 257 U. S. 563 (1922); United States v. Village
of Hubbard, 266 U. S. 474 (1925); Alabama v. United States, 279 U. S.
229 (1929); Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois v. United
States, 289 U. S. 48 (1933); United States v. State of Louisiana, 290
U. S. 70 (1933).
62Cf. Similar statement as to control of agricultural production,
56 S. Ct. 312, 320 (1936).
63Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U. S. 342 (1914); Board of Trustees
of University of Illinois v. United States, 289 U. S. 48 (1933).
6Art. VI, See. 2.
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reasonably adapted to the attainment of the end which alone
would justify the expenditure.' 65
The majority, by denying that this power carries with it the
reasonable incidents necessary to make the granted power effective, either completely repudiated its own opening pronouncement that Hamilton and Story were right in asserting that the
general welfare clause does constitute a substantive grant of
power not limited by the enumerated powers which follow, or it
must have found that there is something in the nature of the
power, of which it does not inform its readers, which required a
construction fundamentally inconsistent with giving any real
meaning to the Hamilton-Story doctrine. Nothing in the Constitution, and nothing in prior decisions, lends the slightest support to any such distinction, but on the contrary both very
clearly indicate the opposite.
Whence comes this strange and novel doctrine then, if not
from the Constitution and not from prior decisions ? And what
becomes of the enunciation at the outset that the Court will hold
an act unconstitutional only when inevitably impelled to do so
by the clear and controlling provisions of the Constitution?
Manifestly the doctrine has just one source-it comes out of the
mind of the Justice writing the opinion, and illustrates the statement, of the truth of which all careful students of constitutional
law have long been convinced, that the Constitution means what
the judges say it means-and the judges change from time to
time.0 6
The closing paragraphs of Mr. Justice Stone's dissent are
worthy of special consideration. Referring to the latter part of
the majority opinion, which catalogued a lengthy list of possible
abuses of the taxing and spending power by Congress should the
legislation under consideration be sustained, which he says hardly rises to the dignity of argument, he counters with the assertion, "so may judicial power be abused", and chides the majority with the statement that a "tortured construction of the Constitution is not to be justified by recourse to extreme examples
of reckless congressional spending which conceivably might
-56 S. Ct. 312, 327, 328 (1936).
0 "We are under a constitution, but the Constitution is what the
judges say it is . . ." From a speech by Charles Evans Hughes
(now Mr. Chief Justice Hughes) before Elmira Chamber of Commerce,
Elmira, N. Y., May 3, 1907. Hughes, Addresses and Papers (1903) 139.

K. L. J.-3
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occur" at the hands of a "legislature lost to all sense of public
responsibility. "67 Then he quotes Mr. Justice Holmes' famous
assertion that "it must be remembered that legislators are the
ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in
quite as great a degree as the courts.'"68 He might have added,
they are equally bound by an oath to support the Constitution.
The final paragraph of this masterly dissent is so packed
with wisdom and warning for all students of government and of
constitutional law as to warrant quotation at some length.
"Courts are not the only agency of government that must be
assumed to have the capacity to govern," he asserts. "Congress and
the courts both unhappily may be mistaken in the performance of
their constitutional duty. But interpretation of our great charter of
government which proceeds on any assumption that the responsibility
for the preservation of our institutions is the exclusive concern of any
one of the three branches of government, or that it alone can save
them from destruction is far more likely in the long run," here
paraphrasing the closing theme of the majority, "to obliterate the
constituent members of 'an indestructible union of indestructible
states' than a frank recognition that language, even in a Constitution,
may mean what it says; that the power to tax and spend includes
the power to relieve a nation-wide economic maladjustment by conditional gifts of money."'m

Thus he closes as he begins, with a ringing admonition to
the Court to restrict itself to its proper judicial function. He
asserts the existence of a danger to our constitutionally established system of government in the proneness of the Supreme
Court to govern by judicial flat, and to set itself up as a superlegislature substituting its judgment for that of the constitutionally created legislative body as to matters of wisdom and policy
involved in legislative acts-constituting itself the ultimate legislative as well as judicial authority whose acts are subject to no
review and from whose determinations there can be no appeal.
Perhaps the most significant feature of the case is Mr. Justice Stone's caustic warnings to the Court against government
by "Judicial flat'' 7 and the employment of "a tortured construction of the Constitution",1 foreign alike to both the letter
and the spirit of that great document, to arrive at a conclusion
6 56 S. Ct. 312, 328, 329 (1936).
c' Missouri, Kansas & Texas R. Co. v. May, 194 U. S. 267, 270

(1904).
'56 S. Ct. 312, 329 (1936).
"DId. at 328.
n Ibid.
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in harmony with ideas of desirability 72 entertained by a majority
in sympathy with the notion that it is "the business of courts to
'73
sit in judgment on the wisdom of legislative action."
The position of the majority throughout is in striking contrast with the clear-cut utterances of Mr. Chief Justice Hughes
and the earlier Mr. Justice Roberts in the two cases discussed74
at the outset of this article. In those cases the Court went back
to the principles so forcibly enunciated by Mr. Chief Justice
75
Marshall in such epoch-making cases as McCullock v. Maryland
and Gibbons v. Ogden,"6 and gave full recognition to the fact
that our national Constitution is an agency of progress, a
flexible and living instrument, capable of being "adapted to the
various crises of human affairs" and "intended to endure for
ages to come.' '7 Those cases recognized as a reality the presumption of constitutionality of an act of Congress until the contrary is clearly demonstrated, while the assertion of Mr. Justice Stone that it is here overturned on the basis of "nothing
more substantial than groundless speculation" ' 8 seems not an
unwarranted observation. That the Court recognized the existence of a national problem requiring for its solution measures
whose application must be coextensive -with the evils involved is
U"The present levy is held invalid, not for want of power in
Congress to lay such a tax to defray public expenditures, including
those for the general welfare, but because the use to which its proceeds are put is disapproved". (Italics supplied.) Mr. Justice Stone's
dissent. Id. at 325. Compare the language of his dissent in the recent
New York Minimum Wage case. "It is difficult to imagine any
grounds, other than our own personal economic predilections, for saying that the contract of employment is any the less an appropriate
subject of legislation than are scores of others, in dealing with which
this Court has held that legislatures may curtail individual freedom
in the public interest." (Italics supplied.) Morehead v. People ex rel.
Tipaldo, 298 U. S. 587, 56 S. Ct. 918, 933 (1936).
- 56 S. Ct. a12, 329 (1936). But see the dissent of Mr. Justice
McReynolds in Nebbia v. People, 291 U. S. 502, 556 (1934). "But
plainly, I think, this Court must have regard to the wisdom of the
enactment."
"Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398
(1934); Nebbia v. People, 291 U. S. 502 (1934).
114 Wheat. 316 (1819).
1,9 Wheat. 1 (1824).
"McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 415 (1819). This statement is preceded by another which might, with equal propriety, be
recalled at this point that, "We must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding". Id. at 407.
Is56 S. Ct. 312, 326 (1936).
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nowhere indicated, but rather the opposite.7 9 Such a recognition, together with a charitable approach toward the purposes of
legislation honestly designed for the relief of nationwide agricultural needs or other similar ills no longer capable of effective
control by action of the individual states, grounded upon a conception of the Constitution as a flexible and living instrument of
government, would seem to require an ultimate departure from
the basic doctrines set forth by the majority opinion in this case.
How far removed we now may be from such a reversal of form
by the Court, no one can safely predict. With a growing prospect, however, for the early enactment of further legislation of a
similar nature to supplement or replace the present less effective soil conservation program, it seems highly probable that the
constitutional problems involved in this case must be faced again
at no far distant date by both the Congress and the Court and in
the meantime merit the continued and profound consideration
of all serious students of constitutional government.

19"It does not help to declare that local conditions
nation have created a situation of national concern;
to say that whenever there is a widespread similarity
tions, Congress may ignore constitutional limitations
powers and usurp those reserved to the states." Id. at

throughout the
for this is but
of local condiupon its own
323.

